As we know, the activity approach to understanding man and his world became widespread in Russian philosophy in the 1960s-70s. At the time, it was, I should emphasize, one of the most significant manifestations of progressive trends in Soviet philosophical thought, which strived to overcome the stagnation and dogmatism of official Marxism. However, as it happens whenever the authority of an intellectual current is established, the activity approach and the category of activity were used frequently in a superficial way, simply (...) because they were fashionable at the time. This gave me occasion to announce, in a collection of articles on the problems of the a tivity approach published in 1976, that a sort of magical word "activity," unsupported by responsible conceptual analysis, was widely used.1 There is no doubt, however, that the development of the activity approach by serious theoreticians was backed up by sufficiently deep conceptual analysis, which advanced our philosophical culture of the time. (shrink)

It is a characteristic of neopositivism that the pursuit of its effort in theoretical cognition, the attempt to discover the "given" content of knowledge, the "empirical significance" of its elements — concepts and assertions — is associated, with the employment of the method of logical analysis of knowledge. On the one hand, this gives logical analysis a distinctly philosophical, epistemological emphasis, while on the other it converts the theory of knowledge of neopositivism into "applied logic," engaged in establishing the relations (...) between the elements of knowledge by means of the procedures of contemporary formal logic — mathematical or symbolic logic. (shrink)

By the "logic of scientific knowledge," or simply "the logic of science" we mean the discipline in philosophy concerned with the application of the techniques and methods of logic to scientific knowledge. In studying certain aspects of the logic of scientific knowledge it is possible to employ successfully not only the methods of dialectical logic but those of formal logic. It is the latter that will be the special concern of the present article.